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Abstract
A Domestic Pas de Deux:
The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist-Regime Relations in Jordan
During the first three decades of the Jordanian kingdom’s existence, the Muslim
Brotherhood was a relatively apolitical charity organization that held a handful of seats in
Parliament. From the mid-1970s onward, however, the Brotherhood grew substantially in size
and influence, so much so that it is now the largest and most broad-based political party in
Jordan. Looking at domestic, regional, economic, social, political and theological factors, this
study seeks to explain the Brotherhood’s dramatic political ascendance and, also, how the regime
has coped with its rise.
A holistic explanation of this phenomenon is the study’s modus operandi. In order to
gather as many different perspectives as possible, my data drew on interviews of (1) members of
the Brotherhood and its political offshoot, the Islamic Action Front; (2) officials in the Jordanian
regime; and (3) independent academics and journalists who have previously studied the topic.
The theory of is this paper is that the political ascendance of the Brotherhood stems from
three factors: (1) its presence in civil society, (2) the resonance of its Islamic message and (3) the
movement’s positioning on the Palestinian issue. I further argue that since the government’s
response has concentrated only on the first variable – and ignores the other two – it can expect
partial, but not complete, success in diminishing the Brotherhood’s popular support.

ISP Codes:
Political Science, 523
Regional Studies: Middle East, 521
History, 524

3

Acknowledgements
This paper could not have succeeded without the help of many people. In particular, I would like
to thank my interviewees – Hayat al-Museimi, Hamza Mansour, Rehail Gharibeh, Musa
Hantash, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, Adnan Abu Odeh and Mohammed al-Momany – for taking
time from their important lives to talk with a lowly undergraduate. I am also indebted to my
wonderful translators – Miriam Abdoh and Noor Darwazeh – who patiently worked to render my
awkward questions into Arabic. Without their help, I’m sure that I could not have talked with
two figures that provided valuable contributions to my research. Finally, I would like to
personally thank the brilliant and colorful Dr. Mohammed al-Masri of Jordan University’s
Center for Strategic Studies, who as my advisor provided helpful support and guidance for this
project. His assistant, Nadham Akkad, also deserves recognition for helping us overcome
technical difficulties and rushed schedules. Thank you, everyone!

4

Copyright permission
The author hereby does grant the School for International Training the permission to
electronically reproduce and transmit this document to the students, alumni, staff, and faculty of
the World Learning Community.
The author hereby does grant the School for International Training the permission to
electronically reproduce and transmit this document to the public via the World Wide Web or
other electronic means.
The author hereby does grant the School for International Training the permission to reproduce
this document to the public in print format.

Student (please print name): Simon Shogry
Signature:
Date: May 10, 2008

5
Table of Contents
Title Page …………………………………………………………………………….. ………… 1
Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………………… 3
Copyright Release …………………………………………………………………...................... 4
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………………….. 5
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….. ………….6
Rationale ………………………………………………………………………………………….8
The First Period, 1948-1967 …………………………………………………………….. 8
The Second Period, 1967-1985 …………………………………………….. …………..11
The Third Period, 1985-Present …………………………………………… …………..15
Reversing Democratic Trends, the Government Gets Serious …………….. …………..17
Literature Review …………………………………………………………………... …………. 21
Benefits from Civil Society ………………………………………………......................22
The Islamic Ideology ……………………………………………………………………24
The Palestinian Issue ……………………………………………………….. . ……….. 27
My Theory: Bridging the Gap ……………………………………………….. ……….. 28
Findings …………………………………………………………………………….. ………… 29
Civil Society: A Potent Force or Non-Issue? ………………………………. . ………...29
Islam as Ideology ………………………………………………………….................... .31
Palestinian Politics ………………………………………………………….. ………… 36
Regime Response: Successful? ………………………………………………. ………...37
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………40
Suggestions for Further Research ……………………………………………………….42
Methodology …………………………………………………………………………………….44
Appendix A: Record of Verbal Consent of Participants ………………………………………..48
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..................... 49
Notes …………………………………………………………………………………………… 51

6
Introduction
The results of the 1989 parliamentary elections – Jordan’s first in over two decades –
confirmed a dramatic shift in the kingdom’s political landscape. As the traditional antagonists of
the regime – leftists, pan-Arab parties and, later, Palestinian nationalists – saw their support
collapse, Islamist candidates in 1989 won big. Capturing over a quarter of the eighty seats in
Jordan’s lower house of Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the kingdom’s
strongest opposition party.
What accounts for this rise? Why did Islamists, who fared poorly during elections in the
1950s and 60s and historically struggled to make gains against secular opposition parties, do so
well in the 1989 election? What factors in Jordan – political, economic or social – had changed?
By looking at (1) the Brotherhood’s dominance in civil society, specifically the attendant
political benefits, (2) the social factors which made the Brotherhood’s religious rhetoric
effective, and (3) the unique capacity of the Brotherhood to empower Palestinians, my research
will offer comprehensive answers to these questions. I will argue that these three dependent
variables are the causal link to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, my
independent variable.
Of course, given the nature of Jordan’s political system, one cannot ask about a
successful opposition party without also looking at the response of the regime. Despite the
trappings of democratic reform, Jordan’s government remains authoritarian. As such, it keeps a
watchful eye on all political trends that could threaten its survival. For the first three decades of
its existence, in fact, the Hashemite monarchy chose a policy of outright repression to deal with
threats from leftists (supported by Syria and Iraq), pan-Arab parties (backed by Nasserite Egypt)
and Palestinian nationalists (a front for the Palestinian Liberation Organization). By directly
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banning the party itself (as in the case of the communists) or even resorting to military action (as
in the case of Palestinian nationalists), the regime contained these movements and, since the
opposition programs called for the dissolution of the monarchy itself, was able to maintain its
rule over Jordan.
When the Islamists were voted into Parliament in 1989, however, the regime adopted a
less confrontational tone, opting to allow them to participate, if only symbolically, in the day-today governance of the nation. 1 The monarchy’s strategy against the Brotherhood – conceived
and implemented during a democratic era – departs from the heavy-handedness of past policies,
replacing overt oppression with a more subtle approach. This paper reviews the regime’s
response to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),
asking whether that response has been “successful.” My research indicates that by (1)
preventing the Brotherhood from exercising any real control over public policy and (2) isolating
the group from its base of support within civil society, the regime has succeeded in marginalizing
the Brotherhood from formal political authority but has only slightly diminished its popular
support. I argue that this mixed success stems from the regime’s strategy, which focuses on only
one out of three variables that determine the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this
paper, I will show that by attacking only one leg of the movement’s support, the regime can
expect a marginal – but not significant – decline in public support for the Brotherhood, as recent
history has shown. Using the same dependent and independent variables throughout the paper, I
will offer a model that explains both the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Jordan as well as the effectiveness of the regime’s efforts to blunt its popularity.
The rise of political Islam in Jordan and the subsequent reaction of the regime are
important to examine not only because they represent a dramatic recent development in
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Jordanian politics, but also because they touch on existential issues of the Hashemite kingdom
itself. If Jordan is a “modern” state, why is the survival of the regime dependent on heavyhanded intervention in the public and private spheres? Yet, at the same time, what other Arab
nation can boast as much stability and political expression as Jordan can? One objective for my
research is to attempt to answer this quandary, and I hope that this paper clarifies the limited
extent of the regime’s substantive commitment to democratization. Another important reason to
study this topic is that analyzing political Islam in Jordan may offer insights into political Islam
in general – an ideology that, in the years ahead, will likely occupy a central role in the
development and implementation of American foreign policy. Drawing on interviews with
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, decision-makers within the regime, as well as
academics and journalists, this study offers an analysis of Jordan’s fundamental political
challenge today, one that intersects issues of ethnic division, civil society, democratization and
repression.
Rationale
It is impossible to discuss the rise of political Islam (as well as the regime’s response to
this phenomenon) without knowing where the Muslim Brotherhood began and what political
obstacles it has overcome. What follows, then, is a brief history, divided into three broad
periods, of the Brotherhood’s movement in Jordan. Each period marks a different stage in its
organizational development as well as its relationship vis-à-vis the state and other opposition
parties within the kingdom. 2
The First Period, 1948-1967: Small but Growing
Spanning the early days of the Hashemite kingdom – from 1946, when the Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood was founded, and into the next two decades – the first historical period
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represents the nadir of the Islamic movement’s influence. 3 During this era, the Brotherhood
made its first foray into electoral politics, which was, by all accounts, rather unsuccessful.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, only a handful of Islamists were elected to Jordan’s Parliament. 4
Judged against the stronger leftist opposition parties, the Brotherhood posted an anemic showing.
Why did Islamists fare so poorly during this period? In a time when secular forces were
consuming all of Jordan’s political oxygen, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself without space
to breathe. The pan-Arab message championed by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser
during the 1950s resonated with the Arab masses, and those living in Jordan were no exception.
Historian Kamal Salibi writes that “practically everybody in Jordan, as in other Arab countries,
stayed tuned to the Voice of the Arabs [Nasser’s radio station] broadcasting from Cairo, to hear
the man they considered the new Saladin address them in person on the issues of the day.” 5
Although outlawed, the communist party also made popular inroads, especially among
Palestinians, with a similar anti-imperialist message exhorting Arabs to throw off Western
oppression and restore lost dignity. By leading public marches and (sometimes violent)
demonstrations against the government, these secular forces tapped into deep-seated popular
frustrations. 6 The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, floundered with its message of social
conservatism – which fell flat during a time of secularized politics and rejection of tradition –
and opposition to Israel, an issue articulated with equal intensity by Nasserists and communists
alike. Mohammed Abu Rumman offers a succinct formulation of the political forces at work: the
Brotherhood at this time “did not have the support of the people, whose mass support went
instead to the nationalist and leftist movement.” 7
Amid an atmosphere dominated by anti-monarchical, radical political forces, the
Hashemites found a friend in the Muslim Brotherhood. Leftists and nationalists used their
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influence to stage protests against the government that on several occasions grew unruly. The
government, surprised by the size and violence of the rallies, called on the army to disperse the
rioters. The regime obviously felt threatened by these forces and – prefiguring future policy –
searched for rival political groups who, with official backing, could sap support from the larger
opposition parties. The Muslim Brotherhood fit such a profile. The mistreatment of fellow
Islamists in Nasser’s Egypt not only angered the Brothers but also gave them cause to worry: if
secular parties repressed Islamists in their home countries, why would they choose a different
policy should they come to power in Jordan? 8 Either out of sympathy for their oppressed
Brothers abroad or fear for their party’s survival at home, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan had
ample reason to oppose the pan-Arab movement.
Sharing a “common threat and fear for their existence,” the regime and the Muslim
Brotherhood saw the benefits of cooperation. 9 Brought together by trying political
circumstances, the government and the Brothers developed a “guarded, but not overtly hostile”
relationship in which the regime encouraged the Brotherhood to establish ties to the society by
founding charity organizations, schools and hospitals, as well as commissioning mosques and
funding friendly imams to disseminate a pro-Brotherhood message. 10 The Brotherhood-operated
forums also provided space for non-affiliated social gatherings, such as sporting events and scout
meetings, to raise the group’s public profile. 11 While some observers characterize this period as
an “alliance” between the regime and the Brotherhood, Nathan Brown points out that, despite
encouragement in the arena of civil society, the regime maintained a watchful eye over the
Islamists, even jailing one of its leaders in 1958 for voicing opposition to the Hashemite-backed
Baghdad Pact. 12 It is also important to note that, during the 1950s and the beginning of the 60s,
the regime supported the Brotherhood’s move into civil society largely in negative terms – i.e. by
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not enforcing anti-associational ordinances against the Brotherhood – only actively encouraging
such trends after the most serious threat to the Hashemite throne: the events of Black September,
1970.
The Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime, however, was not only a marriage of
convenience; their association contained an ideological component as well. The Hashemite
monarchy had historically staked its legitimacy on two grounds: (1) its pan-Arab credentials
earned through leadership of the 1916 Arab Revolt and (2) its deep connection to the Islamic
faith. Hashemites trace their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed and emphasize their
family’s historical role as guardian (sharif) of the holy sites in Mecca. 13 During a period in
which the regime faced serious challenges from left-wing forces, a close relationship with the
Muslim Brotherhood allowed the regime to more credibly claim such Islamic legitimacy.14 Even
at the ebb of Islam’s political currency in Jordan, the Brotherhood’s endorsement of the regime
created a shared ideological front in the face of leftist agitation.
The Second Period, 1967-1985: Alliance with the Regime and Expansion into Civil Society
During the second half of the 1960s, however, the political winds had changed – external
events had reshuffled the political landscape in the kingdom, marginalizing the influence of
leftist radicals. It was around this time that Jordanians began to perceive that the promises made
by Nasser and his allies – to lift up the masses, restore lost Arab dignity and, above all, expel
invaders from the region – failed to materialize. Instead of leading to broad-based economic
empowerment, Nasser’s socialist reforms in Egypt – which were repudiated by his successor,
Anwar Sadat – sparked an economic slowdown that lasted well into the proceeding decades. At
the same time, the economy of Ba’athist Syria also experienced a downturn. But the most
tangible symbol of the decline of Nasserism was the stunning defeat of the Arab armies in 1967
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against Israel, which expanded its territory into the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza in Palestine, the
Golan Heights in Syria and the Sinai in Egypt. This loss underscored the vast distance between
Nasser’s hard-line rhetoric on the Palestinian issue and his ability to produce substantive gains.
Around the same time, a non-state actor, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
became a vehicle through which Palestinians living in Jordanian refugee camps could express a
more militant posture in the wake of the 1967 defeat. This support translated into the creation of
armed militias interested in waging a guerilla war against Israel. Organized by the PLO
operating from Jordan, these fedayeen began strikes into Israel that prompted harsh reprisals, a
situation that King Hussein found unacceptable and sought to stop. Bucking the king’s orders to
cease the attacks, the PLO continued to operate as they pleased. This crisis of sovereignty
erupted into the events of “Black September” 1970, in which the PLO fedayeen and King
Hussein’s armed forces clashed in open war for control of Jordan. 15 The civil war waged on until
March 1971, when the final battle between the PLO and the Hashemite monarchy resulted in the
total expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.
The second phase of the Brotherhood’s history thus spans from 1967, after the Arab loss
and escalation of fedayeen attacks coming from Jordan, until 1985 – an era that witnessed the
blossoming of the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in Jordanian society and its subsequent
rise in popularity. With the military defeat of the PLO and its expulsion from the Hashemite
kingdom, a power vacuum developed within the country’s Palestinian refugee camps, which
were no longer staffed by PLO activists. Looking to forestall a future confrontation with a
radical political ideology, the regime calculated that the Muslim Brotherhood – a group that
rejected violence and, after the turbulent decade of the 1950s, enjoyed a working relationship
with the monarchy – could credibly represent Palestinians without adopting an extremist political
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platform. As a result, the government allowed the Brotherhood to organize within the camps.
Mohammed Abu Rumman writes that the “Brotherhood would successfully exploit this
opportunity… which allowed them to make considerable and significant gains in solidifying and
expanding their social base.” 16
Through both regime policy and effective political timing, the Muslim Brotherhood
steadily grew in size and influence, eventually displacing pan-Arabist, communist and
Palestinian nationalist forces as the dominant political organization in Jordan. By giving the
Brotherhood – and only the Brotherhood – the space to develop charity organizations, schools,
hospitals and orphanages, the regime oversaw the movement’s expansion into civil society.
Given the breadth of its “reform activities,” the Brotherhood developed deep roots in society. 17
Since the government lacked the resources for a comprehensive social safety net, many
Jordanians, especially poor Palestinians, fell through the cracks. It was the Muslim Brotherhood
– not the state – that had an expansive charity network to provide the poor with crucial social
services. Quintan Wiktorowicz explains the political significance of such work:
“Often termed ‘social Islam’, these organizations reflect a growing functional synthesis between
socioeconomic need and religious values. Islamic medical clinics, schools, hospitals, training
centers, charitable societies and cultural associations address pressing development issues while at
the same time propagating a religious message. Islamic NGOs thus serve as institutions for the
production, articulation and dissemination of values, connecting the movement to the community
of the faithful through daily interactions. ” 18

The Brotherhood also reached the richer segments of society through its affiliated
schools, mosques and community centers. By developing a close relationship with Jordan’s
populace at all levels, the Brotherhood accomplished two important things: (1) they were able to
spread their own Islamic views into society and (2) facilitate a dialogue between the people and
the party. The Brotherhood, through its “daily interactions” with the public, listened to the
people’s concerns and, like any other group with ambitions in a democratic polity, incorporated
their views into political priorities – actions that Wiktorowicz calls the “production, articulation
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and dissemination of values.” 19 Islamists during this period also gained control of professional
organizations – syndicates representing educated professionals such as doctors, engineers and
lawyers – as well as labor unions and university student governments. 20 Like the other
organizations within civil society, these, too, provided the movement with media to register the
frustrations of the Jordanian populace and served as protected forums from which its surrogates
could publicly discuss the Islamist message.
Importantly, all of the Brotherhood’s outreach efforts during this period benefited from
the coinciding jump in global oil prices. The price hike enriched Jordan’s neighboring Gulf
States, whose wealthy patrons directed funding towards the Brotherhood’s charities, providing
the movement with ample resources to spread its social conservative message, summarized by
the group’s characteristic slogan: “Islam is the Solution!” 21
The newfound oil wealth of the Gulf States benefited the political prospects of the
Brotherhood in Jordan in a more indirect way as well, since new money in those countries
translated into more economic development, which in turn translated into new employment
opportunities. From the mid-1970s onward, expatriate Palestinians flocked to fill these new jobs.
With Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, however, these same immigrants fled (or returned, in the
case of many Palestinians with family already in the country) to Jordan, bringing with them the
more conservative form of wahabi Islam practiced in the Gulf. 22 The Brotherhood’s socially
conservative rhetoric resonated with these more religious émigrés, providing the movement with
a loyal political constituency.
What made this immigration more significant, however, was that Muslims in Jordan were
not immune to a regional religious revival that combined greater individual piety with an
acceptance of Islam in the political sphere. 23 The Brotherhood’s consistent Islamic message
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exploited this heightened religiosity and gained credibility with a newly spiritual populace. The
most concrete manifestation of this development was the 1979 revolution in Iran, which showed
that the Islamist program commanded broad-based popular support in a powerful member of the
Muslim world. Despite the obvious demographic differences between the revolutionaries there
and in the Arab world – sectarian differences that ruling Arab regimes were anxious to
emphasize – the Iranian Islamists’ successful revolt gave hope to their comrades around the
region. 24 By taking a group of American hostages, giving the Israeli embassy in Tehran to the
PLO and adopting a more confrontational tone in foreign affairs, the revolutionaries blazed the
trail for Islamist anti-Western agitation. For Islamists abroad, this development was momentous:
Khomenei’s guerillas had overthrown a secular authoritarian government trying to modernize the
country, replacing the Shah with an Islamic state, one whose values more closely resembled the
identity of the people. 25 The Islamic popular revolution announced the regional ascendance of a
new ideology: political Islam.
Thus the years between 1967 and 1985 represented the Muslim Brotherhood’s “golden
age” in Jordan: with regional events in its favor, the regime actively encouraging expansion into
civil society and the political savvy to seize the opportunities presented to it, the Muslim
Brotherhood earned “social credit” from the people – credit that the movement would collect on
during subsequent national elections. 26
The Third Period, 1985 to Present: Becoming a True Jordanian Opposition Party
The Islamists’ stunning electoral success in 1989 presented a new challenge to the
regime, which would have to alter old policies to conform to a new democratic era. While
communism, pan-Arab radicalism and Palestinian nationalism could in the past be dismissed as
military threats and contained using brute force and martial law, the Brotherhood’s ascension
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through the ballot box meant that the regime would have to develop more subtle methods of
repression. With these limitations in mind, the government devised a two-prong strategy of (1)
limiting the substantive control of the Brotherhood over public policy and (2) isolating it from its
base of support within civil society. The deterioration of the historic alliance of the regime and
Brotherhood therefore marks the third period of the Islamist movement’s history in the kingdom,
lasting from 1985 – when, for the first time, Jordanian security forces clashed with Islamist
agitators – until the present day. 27
The first prong, as I have termed it, of the regime’s Islamist strategy became necessary
because of King Hussein’s decision to seek peace with his longstanding hostile neighbor, Israel.
Facing chilly relations with the West and the Gulf States after refusing to join the military
alliance against Iraq in 1991, Jordan saw much of its aid and foreign remittances dry up. 28
Fearing the long term consequences of such isolation, Jordan wanted to reengage diplomatically
with regional and global powers and thus forestall another fiscal crisis. The path to do so, it
reasoned, lay in peace with Israel, a domestically unpopular but politically necessary solution to
end Jordan’s international marginalization.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, viewed the situation differently. For them, such
pressure from Western governments was exactly the cause of Jordanian – and, generally, Arab –
decline. No Muslim should shirk his religious duty in fighting to restore all of historic Palestine,
they insisted, and no government has the right to give any part of Palestine to any non-Arab
people. 29 The Brotherhood argued that this goal – the appropriation of Arab land to foreign
powers – was the true purpose of a peace treaty with Israel and urged Jordanians to protest the
government’s participation in the 1991 Madrid peace negotiations and oppose any talk of
recognizing the Jewish State. 30 This was in one sense an easy argument for the Brotherhood to

17
make, since its view conformed to that of the Jordanian populace. But it was also a hard decision
for it to make as well, as this development marked the first ideological disagreement between the
Islamists and the regime. Never before had the Brotherhood, buoyed by popular support, aligned
against official priorities.
Reversing Democratic Trends, the Government Gets Serious
Since the government considered peace with Israel a top political priority and the solution
to its diplomatic woes, it would not tolerate dissent from domestic political forces on this issue –
it therefore implemented measures that would limit the power of opposition groups to affect this
critical policy. 31 Shortly after signaling democratic sympathies by legalizing political parties and
liberalizing the nation’s press and association laws, the government would reverse gears by
passing the elections law of 1993. According to the regime, this law would enshrine the
principle of “one man, one vote” and thus equalize voting rights across the nation. This piece of
sophistry, however, fails to grasp that Jordanian voters elect candidates to Parliament through
multi-member districts. Accordingly, more populous districts have more representation in
Parliament – a district in Amman might have, say, eight members while one in Mafraq may only
have two. Applying the “one man, one vote” rule, then, dilutes the value of votes in more
populous districts and strengthens votes in more rural areas. Since an Ammani has eight
members in Parliament, his one vote signals his preference for only one-eighth of his total
representation in Parliament. A vote cast by a resident of Mafraq, on the other hand, signals his
preference for one-half of the same.
What is the point of such “electoral engineering”? 32 It is no secret that the regime enjoys
greater support – both historically and, to a lesser extent, currently – in rural areas, those mostly
populated by Bedouin and native Trans-Jordanian citizens. It is also no secret that the
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Brotherhood, consistent with the main opposition parties that came before it, is strongest in
urban, populous districts, especially among Palestinians. Given these realities, almost all
observers of Jordanian politics, including members of the government, see only one purpose of
the 1993 elections law: a legislative weapon the regime could use against the Islamist
movement. 33 The regime knew that, in the Jordanian polity, forcing voters to pick only one
candidate meant that many would pick a candidate with whom he had a personal connection – a
friend, someone from the same tribe or family – above a candidate with whom he agreed on
policy. As Glenn Robinson puts it, “making voters choose between [an ideological or tribal
candidate] was rightly seen by the government to favor tribal gatherings at the expense of
political parties.” 34 This choice hurt the IAF’s candidates in the cities (whose voters, due to
gerrymandering, already had a disproportionately small say in the Parliament) as well as in rural
areas, resulting in a loss of five seats, down from 22 to 17. 35 Clearly a sign of the regime’s
success in engineering a more docile legislature, the Parliament elected in 1993 would ratify the
Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty the following year.
In addition to marginalizing the Brotherhood in formal forums of power, the regime
would also attempt to weaken the movement by displacing it from civil society. By dusting off
legislation from the martial law period or crafting new laws that amplified its power, the regime
sought to distance the Brotherhood from, in their view, the sources of its popularity. To remove
the Brotherhood’s presence in Jordan’s mosques, the government turned to the Preaching and
Counseling Law, which holds imams accountable for giving a sermon or “any form of religious
preaching” without prior official approval. 36 In 2006, the government seized the Brotherhoodcontrolled Islamic Center – an umbrella organization in service since 1963 that includes a
hospital, orphanage and charity center for the poor – for alleged financial irregularities, a move
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“widely seen as heavy-handed political pressure.” 37 The regime replaced the Islamists on the
Center’s board with officials more friendly to the government’s goals, thereby robbing the
Brotherhood of control over an organization central to the dissemination of its Islamic message
and that served as a window into popular frustrations.
The regime justified these intrusions into the civil sphere using the Law of Societies and
Social Organizations of 1966, a remnant from the martial law era. 38 Its most sweeping provision
mandates that a voluntary organization must provide “social services without any intention of
financial gains or any other personal gains, including political gains,” a vague phrase exploited
by the security services to break up organizations believed to support opposition groups. 39 The
predominant targets in the last decade have been associations connected to the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Another policy throwback from the martial law period is the regime’s revival of
triangulation as a way to contain opposition forces. In other words, the government has recently
provided support to groups within the greater Islamist movement as a means of undercutting
support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Followers of the salafi movement – a theologically radical
but political quietest ideology that closely resembles wahabism – receive today the same perks
enjoyed by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 50s, 60s and 70s: exclusive permission to
establish a foothold in civil society. 40 The regime hopes – now, just as it did in earlier decades –
that by strengthening a different opposition group, its primary competition will suffer. Just as
the Muslim Brotherhood drew support from leftists in the 50s and 60s and from the PLO in the
70s, so salafis, the regime calculates, will sap political energy from the Muslim Brotherhood
today. Salafis are fellow Islamists and so, the thinking goes, the transition between the groups
will be natural, since Islamists of any stripe will likely share the same political outlook and

20
policy priorities. Less clear, however, is whether the regime has considered the long term
consequences of such a strategy. It was, after all, exactly this type of policy that led to the
ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place. By strengthening one opposition group
over another, the regime achieved short term political success through an alliance of
convenience. But if the government-supported opposition group does not share a strong
ideological attachment to the regime – and it appears the salafis today do not – this policy may
backfire in the long term. 41 For now, though, it appears that the state has not progressed beyond
the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” political logic.
The government’s efforts against the Islamists did not stop with charity work or the
salafis, however. The Ministry of Education also transformed public university student unions
from completely elected bodies to ones half elected, half appointed – and even with control over
appointees, the regime would still provide overt support to government-approved student
candidates and work to prevent the promotion of pro-Brotherhood faculty. 42 These moves – in
addition to the firing of all faculty members sympathetic to the Islamists at al-Zarqa private
university – created a chilling effect on anti-regime political expression on university campuses,
a traditional hotbed of opposition activity. 43
Most overtly, however, the 2007 national elections witnessed what independent
monitoring agencies (as well as the Muslim Brotherhood) have labeled widespread electoral
fraud. 44 “An experienced politician, who asked to remain anonymous,” writes Mohammed Abu
Rumman, a journalist for Al-Ghad, “points out that the 2007 elections, in part, in process and in
result were closer to ‘appointments’ than elections.” 45 Two polling districts in Amman
registered an “astronomical” amount of votes cast for businessmen with few ties, either tribal or
ideological, to the region. 46 At the same time, some IAF candidates – such as Hayat al-Museimi,
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an Islamist representative from Zarqa – received vote totals dramatically lower than previous
turnout trends would predict. Adding to suspicions was that the government bussed in
truckloads of soldiers to vote in districts where they did not live – presumably for the
government-backed candidate – while providing them with false identification cards as a cover
up. 47 These moves raised questions over the legitimacy of the 2007 results, in which the IAF
dwindled to single digit representation in Parliament.
The brief history above is by no means exhaustive; rather, it highlights issues and events
critical for the analysis of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the subsequent
response from the regime. This timeline contains themes important for the theory I present in
this paper, as well as for other interpretations found in the secondary literature. In an attempt to
contextualize the former within the latter, the next section will review the scholarly debate over
the rise of political Islam in Jordan and analyze in what ways my theory departs from, accepts or
amalgamates the main arguments pertaining to this topic.
Literature Review
Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought regarding the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan. The first emphasizes the Brotherhood’s dominance in civil society,
specifically the political benefits that attend such dominance. The second school disagrees,
holding that the content of the Brotherhood’s message – not its ability to disseminate it – is the
more important factor. Within this second school are two variations: arguments that emphasize
the value of the Islamic message in the Brotherhood’s popularity and those that emphasize the
Palestinian issue. My theory attempts to split the difference, arguing that the rise is due to the
combination of these trends.
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Benefits from Civil Society
One iteration of the argument of the first school is found in Glenn Robinson’s excellent
article, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” where he argues that the Brotherhood’s success
in the 1989 Parliamentary elections stems from the movement’s involvement in civil society.
Robinson contends that “the suddenness of the decision to hold elections [in 1989] after such a
long interregnum, the brief duration of the permitted campaign period, and the prohibition of
political parties greatly benefited previously organized groups. As a result, candidates associated
with the long-standing Muslim Brotherhood… were particularly successful.” 48 While political
parties had been banned during the martial law period, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated
organizations were allowed to continue operating. Since it had spent decades providing social
services by the time of the 1989 election, the Brotherhood had in place a sophisticated network
of supporters that showed up on election day. Leftist and Ba’athist political parties, by contrast,
had atrophied after years of inaction. In this way, the Brotherhood’s widespread charity work set
the groundwork for its success in the 1989 elections.
In response, a critic could argue here that success at the polls is only an indicator of prior
political popularity: penetration into civil society may have helped the Muslim Brotherhood win
elections, but that fact alone does not fully explain the movement’s underlying popularity. In
other words, Robinson’s argument may answer how the Brotherhood won elections (party
organization) but has ignored the reasons why. To successfully make their case, advocates of
this view must offer more evidence that it is the Brotherhood’s involvement in civil society – and
this factor alone – that accounts for its political growth over the last four decades.
In response, the civil society advocate would point to different political benefits, besides
voter mobilization, that stem from civil society penetration. First, the Brotherhood’s
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involvement in civil society won the movement a reservoir of popular affection from Jordan’s
poor and middle classes This development becomes clear after contrasting the Muslim
Brotherhood’s capable and extensive provision of social services with the spotty and meager
work of rival political groups, including the government. Since neither political parties (since
they were banned) nor the state apparatus (which was under-funded) set up benefits for Jordan’s
poor, urban, mostly Palestinian population during the martial law period, the Brotherhood’s
monopoly over charity work earned the movement “social credit” with this demographic at the
expense of rival groups. 49 At the same time, the Brotherhood’s work with hospitals and
orphanages built up political capital with richer segments of society as well. In the zero-sum
world of Jordanian politics, a loss by one group is a gain by another: as the Brotherhood’s
opponents dithered and failed to address popular concerns, the Islamists’ competent social work
and political grounding stood in stark contrast. While the government and leftists came off as
aloof from popular woes, the Brotherhood’s extensive outreach through mosques, community
centers, schools and charity organizations showed voters which group genuinely cared about
their interests.
Second, in addition to earning the movement goodwill, these social organizations acted as
forums where the Brotherhood could communicate with the people and the people could
communicate with the Brotherhood – a necessary development for any functioning political
party. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, such communication facilitated the Brotherhood’s
“production, articulation and dissemination of values” – values born from “daily interaction”
with the people and that thus fell in line with popular concerns. 50 This link with the people
simultaneously allowed the movement to spread its Islamist message and to hear the people’s
frustrations. Without this connection – and also without the accompanying social services – rival
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groups to the Brotherhood, i.e. leftist parties and the government, became discredited. For
Jordanian voters, only one party listened to their concerns and delivered on their promises. In
this way, the Brotherhood earned the people’s trust and crafted an uncorrupted, “we’re on your
side” public perception. According to adherents of the first school of thought, then, these are the
reasons the Brotherhood’s involvement in civil society propelled the movement to political
ascendancy.
The arguments advanced by the first school also pertain to the effectiveness of the
regime’s response to the Brotherhood. Judging by the government’s strategy, in fact, it appears
the regime itself subscribes to the first school’s position. The regime’s methods of combating
the Muslim Brotherhood – e.g. seizing the Islamic Center charity, regulating sermons, restricting
the registration of new organizations through the enforcement of martial law ordinances – seek to
remove the group from participation in Jordanian associational life. Since these tactics reflect a
strategy of distancing the Brotherhood from civil society, the government must then implicitly
believe that participation in civil society is the cause of the Brotherhood’s popularity in the first
place, or at least the only cause it can effectively combat. Whether, in fact, such a policy has
succeeded in containing the movement’s popularity is an ideal, empirical experiment in political
science: if after displacing the Brotherhood from civil society the movement’s support dries up,
then its presence in civil society is, in fact, the sufficient condition for its political ascendance; if,
however, displacing the Brotherhood from civil society has little or no effect on the
Brotherhood’s popularity, some other variable must also be responsible for its popularity.
The Islamic Ideology
As it turns out, proponents of the second school of thought believe exactly that. These
scholars agree with some of the premises of their colleagues in the first school but arrive at
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different conclusions. They concede that Jordanian politics are zero-sum, that a gain for one
group is a loss for another, and also that the Brotherhood’s public perception was critical to their
success. They disagree, however, that the most important variable explaining the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood is its presence in civil society. In their view, the movement’s ideology and
rhetoric are more important. Philip Robins argues this position in a 1990 article published in
Middle East Report. 51 There, he rejects Robinson’s contention that party organization was a
major contributor to the Brotherhood’s electoral success in 1989:
“Some candidates and many supporters of groups like the communists... were in prison or in
hiding until barely two months before the election. Nevertheless, such groups did better than most
observers expected. By contrast, liberal groupings... which [had] operated openly for 10 years,
made little electoral impact and took no seats.” 52

Rather than stemming from party organization, the Brotherhood’s strong showing was due to its
public perception as uncorrupted, clean and competent – something that Robins, departing from
the first school of thought, claims is derived from the popular consensus that Islamists best
shared the people’s values. In the minds of Jordanian voters, members of the Brotherhood “were
identified as not being part of the ‘ancién regime’” because of their past criticism of government
policy. By sharing “the same simple, often frugal, lifestyle of their constituents,” Islamist
candidates impressed the public and won their trust. 53 For Robins, it is thus the content of the
Brotherhood’s message – not the ability to disseminate it – that explains the movement’s rise.
For Jordanian academics, however, Robins’s argument presents only a superficial
explanation for the rise of political Islam: for them, all the argument shows is that Islamists did
well because Islam itself was popular. 54 Unsatisfied with such an answer, local scholars take the
argument one step further. Looking at recent history, they analyze why Islam had political
currency in the first place.
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Their answer lies in the resiliency of conservative Arab values – values that went
unchallenged in the modern political discourse of the Middle East and that, as a result, still
represent potent political symbols. As discussed earlier, the late 1970s and 80s witnessed a
regional revival of religion that combined personal observance of Islam with a greater
acceptance of Islamic discourse in the public sphere, a trend best expressed by the 1979 Iranian
revolution. Both before and after that event, however, avowedly “secular” Arab regimes turned
to Islamic symbols during times of crisis to shore up their own domestic support: during the IranIraq war, for example, Saddam Hussein added “allah akbar” to the Iraqi flag, while during his
own crisis Syrian Ba’athist President Hafez al-Assad made a point of praying publicly. 55 Thus,
while the Islamic movement was opposed, challenged and marginalized in Assad’s Syria and
Saddam’s Iraq, Islamic values and culture were not – on the contrary, they represented a
reservoir of support for these regimes during politically difficult times. Thus, even within
ostensibly “secular” polities, Islamic values and symbols remained potent political commodities.
Because the Muslim Brotherhood was the most credible advocate of the Islamist position, it
benefited from the uncontested strength of conservative, religious values. As Glen Robinson
explains:
“Islamist candidates often were seen as pious, selfless, and incorruptible. The candidates
themselves helped this image along by wrapping themselves in the banner of Islam. Voters in
both the 1989 and 1993 elections implicitly were asked to choose between the religious and the
irreligious, even though all the candidates contesting these seats were by law Muslim.” 56

This “banner of Islam” not only helped the Brotherhood win elections: long before any
votes were cast, the Brotherhood was on the right side of the most enduring political
symbol in the region – a position that allowed the movement to make gains against what
the people considered “secular”, “non-Islamic” alternatives.
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The Palestinian Issue
In another wrinkle to the first school-second school debate, many observers find the
division in Jordan between citizens of Trans-Jordanian (i.e. East Bank) origin and citizens of
Palestinian (i.e. West Bank) origin inescapable. This persistent question of identity will arise in
any discussion of Jordanian politics, they say, and the question of the ascendance of political
Islam is no exception. This position, as we will see, holds that a certain type of content in the
Brotherhood’s rhetoric accounts for its rise, which, applying my earlier distinction, places it into
the second school’s camp.
Two authors, Glenn Robinson and Philip Robins, attribute the popularity of political
Islam – and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular – to its ability to neutralize the salience of the
Palestinian-Jordanian divide. Robinson’s crystal-clear formulation of this position deserves
quotation at length:
“The Muslim Brotherhood has been the only organization in Jordan that Palestinian activists can
join and work for a political agenda while at the same time avoiding the label ‘Palestinian.’
Unlike any other Jordanian organization, the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF have had numerous
Palestinians in the upper echelons of leadership, yet these individuals generally have not been
known politically in Jordan as Palestinians.” 57

In the Jordanian polity, the “Palestinian label” carries debilitating connotations for any group,
party or policy attached to it. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has largely avoided this fate,
despite its unabashedly pro-Palestinian political inclination:
“The Muslim Brotherhood is the only party in Jordan that effectively integrates Palestinian
interests without the political baggage of Palestinian ethnicity. No other organization that overtly
espouses a Palestinian nationalist agenda and that is seen to be a legitimate political player in
Jordanian affairs by East Bankers exists (or has existed) in Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood,
then, has carried with it legitimacy in the eyes of East Bankers – even those who oppose its agenda
– that an overtly Palestinian party never could.” 58

As such, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys a resilience that no other party can claim. Since the
early 1990s, when the regime began seriously discussing rapprochement with Israel, the
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Palestinian issue has carried renewed salience in the Jordanian political discourse – specifically
as a popular wedge issue against the government. Robinson and others cite this development as
the main explanation for the Brotherhood’s continuing popularity in the recent past. Because the
Brotherhood provides Palestinians with a legitimate public forum in which they can discuss
Palestinian issues, the movement over the last decade has enjoyed consistent support.
My Theory: Bridging the Gap
I have included this discussion and analysis of the literature on the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan in order to contextualize my own research. Through my interviews with
members of the Brotherhood, decision-makers in the regime as well as journalists and
academics, I have developed my own theory that attempts to reconcile the first and second
schools mentioned above. My paper seeks to incorporate the ideas of both camps, holding that
positive values on three dependent variables – (1) presence in civil society, (2) a credible Islamic
message and (3) the ability to empower Palestinians – account for positive value on my
independent variable, the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. It is important to
note that, in including all three of these dependent variables, I am rebuking the notion that the
two schools of thought are somehow mutually exclusive. Only by incorporating both of their
perspectives, I maintain, do we gain a comprehensive view of the political factors that brought
the Brotherhood to prominence in Jordan. Excluding a few hard-liners on either side of the
issue, my interviewees established a consensus that the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
stems both from its extensive civil society network – and all of the attendant political benefits –
as well as from the content of its political rhetoric.
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Findings
As mentioned earlier, I included the debate within the literature and the history of the
Brotherhood in Jordan to set neutral points of reference for the arguments advanced by my
interviewees. Coming from diverse backgrounds, and sometimes from opposite ends of the
political spectrum, the participants differed on which political events deserved more or less credit
in explaining the Brotherhood’s rise. What follows, then, is an attempt to analyze their views,
which, together, roughly agree that the movement’s ascendance stems from two factors: (1) the
Brotherhood’s presence in civil society and (2) its resonant Islamic message. More controversial
among my sample is my third dependent variable – the Brotherhood’s connection to the
Palestinian issue – which members of the government see as an important factor in the
movement’s rise but that members of the Brotherhood and the IAF vigorously deny. Their
reasons for doing so will be discussed later. For now, however, I will review my interviewees’
perspectives towards the major issues found in the literature.
Civil Society: A Potent Force or Non-Issue?
During our meetings, members of the Islamic Action Front (or IAF, the political party
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) tended to dismiss the civil society explanation for the rise
of their movement. For them, such an explanation is “what the government thinks,” a cynical,
materialist argument that implies a low view of their Jordanian supporters and that denies the
inherent truth and power of the Islamic message. 59 Hamza Mansour – a senior member of the
Islamist party and sitting member of Parliament – best represents this view, taking the
opportunity during our interview to “clarify a big lie said by the government: that charity and
working in the field is the main reason why the IAF has gotten to be part of the Parliament.” 60
The “real reasons” for their rise, he argued, are that the IAF “expresses the conscience of the
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people,” that their “outlook is comprehensive since it covers every aspect of Jordanian life,” and,
third, that they “are close with the people and share with them their daily life.”
But looking at his last reason, why do the people consider the IAF “close” with them in
the first place? Adopting a less ideological position than their colleague, two other members of
the IAF – Rehail Gharibeh and Hayat al-Museimi – concede that the answer lies in the
movement’s activities in civil society. “The government thought that by controlling the most
popular social services center, the Islamic Center, they were getting control of the IAF,”
Gharibeh told me. “This is because the IAF gets its popularity from its social work, and that’s
why [the government] controls it in an illegal way.” 61 Hayat al-Museimi agrees on the
motivation behind the government’s seizure: the security services “lied and said financial and
administrative problems” were why they took control, she said, “but the real reason was because
we were helping the people who stood with us in the election.” 62 Both of these comments are
instructive because they reveal, despite Mansour’s protestation to the contrary, that members of
the IAF see political significance in their work in civil society. The way that the Brotherhood
and the IAF demonstrate that they “stand with the people” and share their values is by
communicating with and helping them through the movement’s affiliated organizations. To
illustrate this point, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat told me an “Egyptian joke”: “A Nasserist Egyptian
official approached a member of the Brotherhood there and told him that the government had no
way of competing with the Islamists for the public’s affection. ‘That is because you see them
five times a day,’ he said ‘while we see them at most only once a week!’” 63 The pun here is that,
through their presence in the mosque, the Brotherhood can indeed communicate with the people
“five times a day.” Meetings of the Nasserite socialist party, on the other hand, only take place
“once a week.” Local academic Mohammed al-Momany agrees with this view, arguing that the
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Brotherhood’s extensive (and hitherto protected) sphere of activity in civil society allowed the
movement to forge a close bond with the people. 64
The arguments from my interviewees here corroborate the first school’s account.
Following Wiktorowicz, they point to the importance of “daily interaction” with the people,
which the Brotherhood achieves though its presence in the mosques and other public forums, as
the “Egyptian joke” demonstrates. Even Mansour himself seems willing to admit this much:
after the regime’s move to displace the Brotherhood from civil society, he was pessimistic that
the IAF could in the short term “restore its link with the people” that had been severed by the
government. 65 By facilitating dialogue with the people – and thus creating an uncorrupted, “we
share your values” public perception, as scholars from the first school maintain – the
Brotherhood’s work in civil society, according to al-Momany and members of the IAF, explains
the enduring support for the party in Jordan.
It is unsurprising, then, that IAF members are troubled by the regime’s recent moves to
uproot the Brotherhood from its historical presence in civil society. Musa Hantash, a failed IAF
candidate in 2007, as well as his colleagues Gharibeh and al-Museimi echo Mansour’s fears that
this tactic has, if only temporarily, succeeded in distancing the party from the people and thus
undercut its base of support. Gharibeh concedes that the move has had a “negative effect,”
preventing the movement from “talking with the people.” Hantash laments that “no longer can
we organize and present the public’s complaints.” 66 This development, they said, has hampered
their ability to communicate with the people, removing one pillar from their winning formula.
Islam as Ideology
Despite this setback in the civil society sphere, members of the IAF remain confident in
the strength of Islamic values, something that, as an Islamist party, they can credibly espouse.
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Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, former Secretary General of the IAF and Speaker of the Parliament,
maintains that, unlike communism or Ba’athism, Islam is an ideology that comes from “within”
Jordan. “You have to think about who we are,” Dr. Arabiyyat told me. “We are not foreigners;
we are from the heart of the people. Socialism and communism are from abroad. We represent
the origin, the faith, the philosophy of the people.” 67 His colleague, Rehail Gharibeh, agrees,
pointing to the enduring strength of the Islamic “idea”: “the IAF believes in an idea,” he said,
“and the idea always persists and is sustained forever. The regime, however, works with certain
people, and certain people will one day change.” 68 These arguments imply that the Islamic
message promoted by the IAF contains some sort of added political resiliency above and beyond
the concrete work the movement does in civil society.
Looking at history, however, these same members concede that the Islamic “idea” was
not always this potent. As mentioned earlier, the Brotherhood posted anemic showings in the
elections of the 1950s and 60s, losing badly to the more popular leftist and pan-Arab Nasserist
parties. Members of the IAF concede that Nasser’s overwhelming popularity left little space for
the Brotherhood in Jordan to gain political traction. But they also consider other factors
important as well. In al-Museimi’s view, the Brotherhood’s weakness stemmed from a popular
misunderstanding of Islam’s place in society. At that time, “Islam was taught to the people as a
tough religion, [as something only consisting] of religious and moral obligations,” she said.
“They didn’t teach the real Islam.” For al-Museimi the “real Islam” means a more
comprehensive Islam – a holistic religious perspective that touches on economic, social and,
most importantly, political issues. 69 In the 50s and 60s, “the people tried to separate Islam and
politics, so that I could be a good Muslim but [could still] choose a different orientation” than
Islamism, she said. “People now understand that Islam is for public and private life.” 70
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Later, the dynamics that propelled pan-Arab and leftist parties into prominence –
discussed in depth in the earlier history section – would reverse. The failure of the leftist
regimes to defend Arab lands (exemplified by the 1967 defeat) and to lift up the Arab masses
(exemplified by the recessionary Egyptian and Syrian economies) eroded their public support
and discredited their political ideology. Before these setbacks, “the people tried to see whether
the [leftist] solutions would work,” al-Museimi argued. “They gave them space to try their
solutions.” 71 These failures, however, exhausted the people’s patience, both in leftist countries
and abroad. With “Arab Socialism” discredited and Palestinian nationalism in decline after a
few brief years in ascendance, political Islam took center stage in Jordanian politics. “Nasserism
was deflated by losses in 1967 and 1973, as were other Palestinian groups,” contends Abd alLatif Arabiyyat. The leftists “claimed something and didn’t achieve anything, and at the same
time of the declining of these socialist parties, there was the rise of the Islamist party.” 72 As this
account makes clear, the eroding credibility of leftists abroad offered a political opening fully
embraced by the Brotherhood. 73
More was at work politically, however, than the mere decline of Arab Socialism: in order
for the Brotherhood to gain from the leftists’ fall, the movement had to offer a legitimate
alternative to Nasserist failures. As mentioned earlier, Jordanian academics hold that the
Brotherhood gained political prominence because of the resiliency of conservative religious
values. 74 Even leftist regimes, such as those of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad, exploited
these values during times of crisis in order to shore up their own domestic support. And even if
they did oppose the Islamist movement and repress its members, no serious Arab political figure
or ideology challenged Islamist values. 75 Left intact by these “secular” Arab regimes, Islamic
symbols remained potent in Arab political discourse throughout modern Middle Eastern history.
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Not only, then, did Islamists offer a chance for Arabs to turn the page on the disastrous failures
of the leftists; it also provided a compelling rationale of its own, one that drew on symbols dear
to the people and whose political value had not diminished over the last fifty years. 76
Members of the IAF largely corroborate this account, adding that only they – the true
advocates of the Islamic position, not leftists engaging in political posturing – benefited from this
trend. Voters, they said, can tell the difference between candidates that hold substantive Islamic
values and those that merely parrot such rhetoric and use religion as a tool for their own gain.
Rehail Gharibeh argued that the “Muslim public is able to differentiate between those who are
committed to Islam and those who are raising the motto just for their own sake.” 77 Hayat alMuseimi put it more bluntly: “the people can distinguish between real and false Muslims.” 78
Hamza Mansour agreed, offering an additional explanation. The IAF is “not using Islam; we are
living Islam! We are more credible [in this regard] because we don’t use religion for certain
purposes but rather implement it into everything [we do].” 79 Despite this caveat, these IAF
figures have no quarrel with the main thrust of the argument: with conservative, religious values
dominant, the Muslim Brotherhood, as an Islamist party with a credible Islamist message, was
best positioned to ride this wave into political ascendancy.
Either through articulating a message that fit neatly into regional trends, then, or
benefiting from a credibility gap vis-à-vis leftist and Palestinian nationalist parties, the political
potency of the Islamist brand propelled the Muslim Brotherhood to prominence. My
interviewees acknowledge both of these trends as important causal factors in Brotherhood’s rise.
Returning to an earlier distinction, then, these arguments fit into the second school, as they posit
that the message of the Brotherhood had a greater impact than did its work in civil society.

35
Adnan Abu Odeh advances an argument along the same lines. He maintains that the
Brotherhood’s associational presence cannot alone be the cause of its political ascendance.
While providing charity work and other services to the public did, in fact, earn the Brotherhood
goodwill, it cannot explain the movement’s rising popularity because, as Abu Odeh points out,
leftists provided their own type of social services, which earned them goodwill as well. With
support from their patrons abroad, socialists in Jordan gave scholarships to study in Russia and
Eastern Europe to men who would not otherwise be able to attend university, “something more
serious than the Brotherhood’s ‘charity.’” 80 For Abu Odeh, the leftists’ social work shows that
civil society alone is not a sufficient condition for the rise of the Brotherhood in Jordan.
Instead, Abu Odeh subscribes to second school-type arguments, albeit ones that use
linguistic evidence that no Western analyst has ever before considered. While the decline of the
leftists was important in the Brotherhood’s rise, it was not all important. Their weakness, in a
manner of speaking, opened a door for the movement but could not make them walk through.
That, Abu Odeh maintains, was achieved by the Brotherhood’s credibility with the people,
which, for him, stemmed from their Islamic rhetoric. The word for reform in Arabic, yasaleh, is
close to another word – saleh – that has linguistic connotations that reinforce the Brotherhood’s
religious credentials. Abu Odeh points out that saleh can also mean straightforward or pious –
attributes that the Brotherhood seeks to emphasize in crafting their public perception. He insists
that “to the mind of the ordinary voter, the Muslim Brotherhood is closer to reform than anyone
else because of this psychological connection.” 81 Through subtle political imagery, the
Brotherhood reinforced its reform bona fides and earned the confidence of the people, a
development that helped cement its status as the dominant political organization in Jordan.
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Palestinian Politics
As mentioned earlier, Glenn Robinson argues that the IAF has enjoyed enduring
popularity over the past decade for its ability to advocate a hard-line position on Palestinian
issues without carrying the attendant Palestinian “political baggage.” 82 The IAF refuses to
compromise on issues such as normalization with Israel and recognition of Hamas, but, unlike
other pro-Palestinian outfits, still manages to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of East Bank
Jordanians. This development did not come about by accident. The IAF, for example, selects
candidates in rural districts by two criteria: allegiance to the Islamist position and also, for the
sake of electability, a local tribal affiliation. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat also admitted that, in the
same vein, Palestinians within the Brotherhood leadership always push for an East Banker to
lead the IAF, presumably a way to further distance the party from the Palestinian political label.
Robinson sees this strategy as decisive in sustaining the IAF’s support.
My research found that, despite the force of these arguments, members of the IAF deny
Robinson’s view. Without exception, every Islamist I talked to stressed that ethnicity plays no
part whatsoever in their position on the Palestinian issue. Rehail Gharibeh even went so far as to
say that “Islam calls for union of different peoples and an end to discrimination. Our party’s
goal is to fight discrimination based on race.” 83 At the same time, however, they stress that
Islam demands solidarity against oppression and that a good Muslim must stand with other
Muslims in fighting occupation. 84 While many members of the party have “Palestinian origins
or relatives living in Palestine,” Hayat al-Museimi said, embracing the “Palestinian issue is for us
something that comes from our religion.” 85
On the other hand, members of the government that I interviewed seem to subscribe to
Robinson’s argument. Adnan Abu Odeh thinks it is “true,” only adding that since Islam, as a
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religion, “transcends nationalism, sectarianism and ethnicity,” Islamists can clothe their
arguments with universal concepts and still convey a very particular platform – i.e., an
uncompromising hostility toward the peace process. 86 It thus makes sense for the IAF to deny
Robinson’s argument: if they did not and chose to descend into ethnic politics, they would lose
the advantage of high-minded universality that their Islamic discourse confers. Also, as the PLO
moderated on the Palestinian issue – as illustrated by its acceptance of the Oslo accords – the
Brotherhood, which has never wavered from its hard-line stance, brought more radical
Palestinians into its fold. 87 Abu Odah’s arguments here completely accept Robinson’s overall
storyline, adding only a few more details to flush out the position and show why the IAF has
political incentives in denying it.
Regime Response: Successful?
All my interviewees – whether from the IAF, the government or the halls of academia –
agreed that the regime has succeeded in marginalizing the power of the IAF in formal political
forums. The 1993 electoral law and the principle of “one man, one vote” have succeeded in
electing fewer Islamists to Parliament, as seen by their decreasing presence in 2003 as compared
to 1993 – they boycotted in 1997 – and again in 2007 as compared to 2003. As Abu Odeh put it,
“the Brotherhood’s number in the Parliament is [enough] evidence of the effectiveness” of these
measures. 88 While labeling the election law “illegal” and “unjust,” members of the IAF
nonetheless come to same conclusion: “it has decreased the number of our friends in
Parliament.” 89
Equally unanimous is the view that the regime has succeeded in displacing the
Brotherhood from civil society, which has in turn hurt the movement politically. According to
Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, it was social reform and charity work that brought the Brotherhood into
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politics, and so by removing it from these arenas, the government has caught the movement off
guard. 90 This development also concerns current members of the IAF, who lament the lack of
communication with the people and its subsequent implications for the party’s popularity. 91
Despite recognizing this tactic’s effectiveness, however, Jordanian Islamists remain optimistic.
Hayat al-Museimi insists that the movement is
“like flowers everywhere in the soil. The government should believe that we are in the hearts and
minds of the people… We have members of the party who view talking to people and helping the
party as religious duties, like fasting or praying. We are talking with our family, friends and
colleagues, so if [the government is] trying to prevent us from talking, we will find another way to
do so.” 92

Despite a sanguine attitude, al-Museimi’s comments here imply that the government prevented
the IAF from talking with the people in the first place, which is the direct result of the regime’s
emphasis on removing the movement from civil society.
While my IAF interviewees have come to expect political gamesmanship from the regime
and subtle forms of repression, they were taken aback by the overt government interference
displayed in the 2007 national election. By bussing in friendly voters, issuing them false
identification cards and tampering with final vote totals, the government went to unprecedented
lengths in marginalizing the Brotherhood. Speaking of these measures, Hayat al-Museimi
remarked that those in the IAF “didn’t think things would become as bad as they were.” 93 Given
the recent fractious history between the IAF and the regime, however, one would think the
movement would anticipate any and all attacks against it. Yet until 2007, the IAF-regime
relationship had not descended into a state of all-out war. There was, in fact, a widespread belief
inside the IAF that the government respected the movement’s contribution to Jordanian society.
King Hussein “said that [the Brotherhood] is an essential part of society, and so we can’t exclude
it from the country,” reported Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, one of the Islamist movement’s more
senior leaders. “The King recognized our party, showed us respect and recognized our work
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when we met him.” 94 One unfortunate result of the 2007 elections, however, is that Arabiyyat’s
faith in the government seems to be disappearing among younger members of the IAF. Neither
Gharibeh, al-Museimi nor Mansour was willing to attribute to the government the same good
intentions as Arabiyyat was. Perhaps this stems from another development the IAF has become
aware of: the government’s sponsorship of rival groups within the Islamist movement to
undercut their base of support. 95
Academics and interviewees associated with the government, however, point to a
different development as representative of the deteriorating relationship between the regime and
the IAF. The party’s support for Hamas in the wake of its 2006 victory in Palestinian elections
“scared the regime,” according to Mohammed al-Momany. “That’s why the government shifted
from tolerating to cracking down on the Islamists.” 96 Adnan Abu Odeh agrees. A fear that “the
Hamas model” would spread into Jordan, he says, prompted the regime to take harsher steps
against the Brotherhood. 97 One of these steps included taking their own fears public: in its
official rhetoric, the government began accusing the Jordanian Brotherhood of being in league
with foreign Islamist forces such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The Brotherhood’s own hard-line
foreign policy played into the hands of this critique, proof for journalist Mohammed Abu
Rumman of the validity of the government’s account: “one finds that the Brotherhood’s interests
are aligned with those of the Hamas movement. Their interests lie also in an alliance with Iran,
Syria and Hezbollah in confronting what the Brotherhood considers ‘the American Plan for the
Middle East.’” 98 Additionally, after watching the civil war rage between Hamas and Fateh for
control of the Palestinian Authority and grimacing at the authoritarian character of Hamas’s rule
over Gaza, Jordanians began to view the Palestinian Islamists in a negative light. 99 By
connecting the Brotherhood to Hamas (and, more distantly, to Hezbollah), the regime succeeded
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in undercutting the movement’s popularity, sowing fears that the Brotherhood would bring about
the same type of instability seen in Palestine and Lebanon.
Adnan Abu Odeh identifies another way the regime has successfully morphed the
perception of Brotherhood – one that, like the Hamas charge, cuts into the base of the
movement’s support. Abu Odeh argues that the 2006 seizure of the Islamic Center serves the
government’s goals in two important ways. First, as discussed earlier, it removes the
Brotherhood from its presence in civil society, which in turn robs it of a public forum from
which the movement can disseminate its popular-based political platform. Second, and more
important, charging the Brotherhood’s organization with financial impropriety directly undercuts
the Islamist movement’s perception as uncorrupted and clean. “The fact that [the government]
arrested the Islamic Center board members was an attempt to discredit their “yasalleh” [i.e.
reform-minded] reputation,” argues Abu Odeh. The charges of fraud show that Islamists “can
cheat the government too.” 100 By directly attacking the Brotherhood’s strength – its public
perception as uncorrupted, pious, straightforward, saleh – the government neutralized an
important aspect of its successful mass appeal.
Conclusion
What do all these developments mean? Into what larger context do they fall? Drawing
on the secondary source literature and my interviews in the field, I argue that three dependent
variables – (1) presence in civil society, (2) a resonant Islamic message and (3) a strong
Palestinian component – explain the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, my independent
variable. Because the regime has responded to the Brotherhood by addressing only one of these
variables – the Brotherhood’s presence in civil society – it has achieved partial, but not complete,
success in diminishing the movement’s popular support. The Brotherhood suffered tremendous
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losses in the 2007 national election, when its membership in Parliament shrunk to single digits, a
delegation not much bigger than that of the Brotherhood during the nadir of its power in the
1950s and 60s. Because of widespread electoral fraud and gerrymandered districts, however,
representation in Parliament does not accurately reflect popular support. Yet according to
opinion polls, Jordanian support for the Brotherhood, while still higher than that for any other
opposition party, has dropped slightly over the past few years. 101
This is consistent with the theory I have presented in the preceding pages: by attacking
only one source of its support, namely its presence in civil society, the regime has achieved only
partial success in diminishing the Brotherhood’s popularity. Although official propaganda
stresses the Hashemite’s religious credentials – emphasizing, for example, its role in fomenting
the 1916 Arab Revolt and reminding the people of their the monarchy’s historic role as the
guardian (sharif) of the holy sites in the Hejaz – the government cannot compete effectively with
the IAF on the issue of who is more Islamic. 102 The regime’s efforts, for example, to sponsor
Koranic memorization contests fell flat. 103 This particular failure, however, represents a more
general trend: the IAF has consistently outmaneuvered the regime on its religious credentials.
As a result, the IAF remains today the most credible Islamist political organization in Jordan.
At the same time, the Islamists’ strength on the Palestinian question has gone
unchallenged. The continued marginalization of Palestinians from political power – through
gerrymandered Parliamentary districts that give added weight to rural areas and unwritten
discrimination in public sector employment and university admissions, to name just two areas –
has kept the issue alive. 104 As mentioned earlier, moderation on the Palestinian question by both
the Jordanian monarchy (which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994) and the PLO (which
accepted the 1996 Oslo Accords) pushed more radical Palestinians into the IAF fold. And
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although this advantage was mitigated slightly by the declining popularity of Hamas, the
Brotherhood as an Islamist party still enjoys the ability to discuss Palestinian issues without the
accompanying Palestinian political baggage. These developments, joined in tandem, have
handed the Islamists in Jordan a major asset: reliable support from the nation’s large Palestinian
populace.
The government’s strategy against the Brotherhood – which only involves decreasing its
presence in civil society – ignores these two sources of its popular support. Through its failure to
compete with the Brotherhood on the issue of its Islamic credentials as well as its refusal to
engage Islamists on the Palestinian issue, the regime has left intact two pillars of the movement’s
popularity. As such, we have seen only a marginal reduction in the movement’s support, a
development that has not changed the overall power dynamics in Jordan. 105 While weaker today
than it was five years ago, the Brotherhood still remains the kingdom’s only functional
opposition party. 106
Suggestions for Further Research
In the course of writing this paper, I have come across some issues that, to my
knowledge, have not yet been thoroughly discussed in the Western literature. The first involves
the appropriation of religious symbols by supposedly “secular” Arab dictators, such as Saddam
Hussein and Hafez al-Assad. I maintain that the use of these symbols by this type of leader calls
into question the scholarly consensus that radical leftists (e.g. pan-Arabists and Ba’athists) were
actually “secular” parties, as they are now classified. Insofar as their political programs lacked
an overt Islamic rationale, this characterization is of course accurate: Arab socialism, like its
European equivalent, eliminates religion’s role in the state, since the guiding political philosophy
is by definition atheistic. If, on the other hand, we attempt to label Saddam and al-Assad’s
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political discourse – i.e. the symbols they emphasized, the rhetoric they employed – as “secular,”
then perhaps we must coin a new term, since these “secular” regimes plainly invoke Islamic
terms and ideas. The literature, then, must take into account the persistence of Islam as a potent
political symbol – itself a factor in the Brotherhood’s rise in Jordan – even within polities with
non-religious discursive frameworks.
A second interesting but unexplored issue is the ironic path of the Brotherhood’s political
ascendance. The movement’s penetration into Jordan’s associational life – a development that
Wiktorowicz and others consider to have propelled the Brotherhood to prominence – was a direct
result of earlier regime policy. By encouraging Islamists to establish a base in civil society after
the expulsion of the PLO in 1971, the regime unknowingly planted the seeds that would grow
into its future opposition.
Finally, my research clarifies the substantive commitment of the Jordanian regime to
political liberalization, a point on which some in the Western literature have waffled. Despite
the formal advances in the nation’s democratization – the country holds regular elections, has a
functioning Parliament as well as a plethora of political parties – Jordan’s system remains
fundamentally authoritarian. Power resides in an unelected, unaccountable monarchy and in
particular one that has recently leaned more heavily on its security services than in earlier
periods. 107 As for its commitment to electoral integrity, a central tenet of democracy, the
accusations against the government during the 2007 national election (which are likely true given
the independent groups leveling the charges) demonstrate the limited extent of Jordan’s
liberalization project. Unfortunately, it appears that the regime today has not moved very far
from the days of its unabashed exercise of authoritarian power to quash its political foes.
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Relatively speaking, however, Jordanians still enjoy a high level of political expression within
their remarkably stable kingdom.
In the years ahead, this tension between increasing political liberalization – a
development the King himself views as inevitable – and the regime’s authoritarian instincts will
likely continue. Such ambiguity will unfortunately shed no light on Jordan’s existential
quandary, as modernization in Jordan is still incomplete. What role the IAF will play in a
“modern” Jordan depends, of course, on the regime. Continuing its present policy would suggest
that the regime considers the Islamist platform and a liberal state mutually exclusive. If the
regime decides on a more substantive commitment to democracy, however, then the Islamists,
too, should take their place as an integral partner in Jordan’s future.
Methodology
In analyzing the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the regime’s
subsequent response, my research drew from two main sources: materials from the secondary
literature, mostly books and articles from academic journals, and interviews with journalists,
academics and members of the IAF and government. Since the first source requires no further
methodological explanation and comprised a minority of the information that I used in my paper,
this section will focus on the second.
My first methodological decision was to choose a qualitative study over a quantitative
one. This choice meant that I would primarily use the informed opinions and impressions of my
participant sample, instead of hard numbers or graphs, to develop my conclusions. This choice
stemmed mostly from the character of my topic, which, as a complex political phenomenon,
hinges on variables that are difficult to exactly quantify. To get richer, more useful data, I opted
to use qualitative methods of analysis.
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I also designed my study to paint a holistic portrait of the political forces at work in the
political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. To do this, I would need to draw
upon many different perspectives, a goal that I hope my final theory – which incorporates the
views of academics, members of the government and the IAF – has achieved. In order to
preserve analytical continuity – and avoid messy ad hoc explanations of the phenomenon – I
demanded that my hypothesis use the same variables to explain both the Brotherhood’s rise and
the effectiveness of the regime’s response. Again, I hope that my final theory – which uses the
same one independent variable and three dependent variables throughout the entire paper – has
succeeded in this regard. With the exception of Glenn Robinson’s excellent article, most
theories from the Western literature present one of my dependent variables (say, penetration of
civil society) as the only variable that explains the phenomenon. 108 In my opinion, this approach
impoverishes our understanding of political Islam in Jordan, as it fails to grasp the whole
political picture.
With a holistic explanation as my modus operandi, I designed survey instruments that,
while limiting the interview to a few specific sub-topics, did not force the participants to answer
in one of a set number of ways. In other words, my interviews used open-ended but pre-figured
questions. Because of the complexity of the topic and the diversity of the opinions regarding it,
open ended questions gave the interviewees enough space to articulate their own perspective.
After hearing their general ideas about the topic, however, I moved on to more specific
questions: I asked them to evaluate theories I had encountered in the literature on the rise of and
response to the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Even when
discussing these more specific subjects, my questions remained open-ended. My strategy was to
lay out a theory and then ask them whether they “agreed or disagreed.” Given that about the
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same number of interviewees agreed with a certain theory as disagreed, I think this strategy
succeeded in avoiding bias for one answer. While the interview questions differed slightly
depending on the interviewee – members of the government were asked more questions about
the regime’s thinking, while members of the IAF were asked to comment on the inner
deliberations of the party, for example – the questions remained generally the same from
participant to participant. My goal was to solicit deep, rich answers on a specific set of topics.
As is the case with any qualitative researcher, the safety and comfort of my participants
was my top priority. I worked hard to avoid offending a culture that has so graciously hosted me
over the last three months. With that said, however, I decided to forego an Informed Consent
Form because I thought the paperwork might inadvertently confer a sterile, distant feel to my
interviews when the goal was informal, frank conversation. Since I am dealing with politicians –
whose political statements are a matter of public record, according to IRB guidelines – I also felt
more comfortable dispensing with the Form. Of course, I verbally confirmed with my
participants that their statements would be kept confidential, and that, should the interview make
them uncomfortable, they could end it at any time. Despite this statement, all of interviewees
insisted there was no problem attributing comments to them by name. During our meetings, we
discussed factors that, in the interviewees’ opinion, were important in explaining the rise of and
the response to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Most interviews lasted sixty to ninety
minutes.
For this project, I interviewed eight people. I talked to five members of the Islamic
Action Front: in English, Hayat al-Museimi, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat and Musa Hantast; in Arabic
with a translator, Rehail Gharibeh and Hamza Mansour. These two interviews felt more distant
and awkward, mostly because all our communication had to go through an intermediary. From
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the government, I talked with Adnan Abu Odeh. (Repeated calls to Abdel Salam al-Majali,
Jawad Anani and Sameer Habashneh were not returned.) Here, one can see another problem I
encountered: the sample size from the government is clearly smaller than that from the IAF.
This did not occur by design. Nonetheless, my research still benefited from the contributions of
Adnan Abu Odeh. Given his extensive experience working in the government as well as the
breadth of his knowledge of Jordanian politics, Abu Odeh represented the regime’s perspective
well. I also talked with Mohammed al-Momany and Mohammed al-Masri, two local Jordanian
academics who specialize in democratization and political Islam.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent
All interviewees in this study were voluntary participants. Before discussing anything, I
informed the interviewees that they had the right both to the anonymity of their comments and to
end the interview at any time should the questions make them uncomfortable in any way. All
participants confirmed they understood these rights before the interviews began.
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At the outset, it is important to note that not all political Islamists are members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, but all members of the Muslim Brotherhood are political Islamists. “Islamism”
qua political ideology is a bigger category than members of the Muslim Brotherhood, containing
less institutionalized and organized movements such as the Salafi and wahabi. I have preserved
this distinction throughout the paper.
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This division follows the work of Mohammed Abu Rumman in his Muslim Brotherhood
volume.
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14
Joffe, Jordan in Transition, 70-71
15
Ibid., 239-241.
16
Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 20.
17
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18
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Interview, Mohammed al-Masri.
25
Interview, Mohammed al-Masri.
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27
Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 21.
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Interview with Hamza Mansour.
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Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 23
31
Nor on its policy of trading domestic subsidy cuts for loans from the IMF.
32
See Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Electoral Engineering.”
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G. Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 397. This argument came from
Robinson’s interview with Izz al-Din, an official within the prime ministry at the time the 1993
elections law was passed.
34
Ibid., 397.
35
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Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 76.
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42
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43
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agitation at Yarmouk University in 1985.
44
See, for example, reports by the Amman Center for Human Rights Studies, the National
Center for Human Rights – groups not allowed by the government to monitor the 2007 election.
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